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Abstract 
I measure the impact of sex offenders on housing sales prices by 
combining data from the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry 
with data on housing sales from December 2004 through 
December 2008 in Mecklenburg County, NC. Using time-series 
and cross-sectional analysis, I estimate that the arrival of a sex 
offender into a neighborhood decreases housing sales prices within 
0.1 of the miles of a sex offender by approximately 6%, while all 
other nearby housing sales prices are unaffected. I then apply this 
finding to examine sex offender residency restrictions passed in 
North Carolina in 2006. I find that houses located within 
neighborhoods where a sex offender can no longer reside 
experience an increase in sales prices of roughly 2% as a result of 
this law. This is consistent with related research and theoretical 
models of housing prices. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Throughout the past two decades, a number of laws have been passed 
which are designed to increase public awareness of sex offenders. Recently, 
several states have also placed further limitations on sex offenders by establishing 
residency restrictions, or zones where sex offenders are not allowed to reside. 
North Carolina is an ideal state to study the impact of these laws, as there are 
robust data sets available to the public that document sex offenders.  In North 
Carolina, all sex offenders either convicted or released from prison on or after 
January 1, 1996 are registered in the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry that is 
freely available online. Anyone who accesses this database can view the names 
and residential addresses of all registered sex offenders in North Carolina, as well 
as pictures and identifying information such as height, weight, scars and tattoos.  
One interesting economic consequence of the public availability of sex 
offenders’ locations is the influence on nearby housing prices. Leigh Linden and 
Jonah Rockoff, two economists at Columbia University, have studied the effects 
of sex offenders on nearby property values in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina. This is the most populated county in North Carolina, and includes one 
of the largest cities in the United States, Charlotte.1  Linden and Rockoff (2008) 
conclude that when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, the prices of 
nearby homes drop significantly. Analyzing data on property sales from 1994 
through 2004, they concluded that the average sale price of a house located within 
                                                 
1 In 2011, the estimated population of Charlotte was 751,087, making it the 17th 
largest city in the United States 
(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37/3712000.html). 
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0.1 miles of a sex offender drops by about 4 percent, or roughly $5,500.  
Altogether, they estimate that property sales decreased by roughly $60 million in 
Mecklenburg County alone.2  
My research is divided into two parts. In the first half, I extend the 
research conducted by Linden and Rockoff (2008). I use data on sex offenders 
and single family home property sales in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina to 
examine the effects of proximity to sex offenders on housing sale prices in the 
two years following their data using difference-in-difference and standard 
regression models. This new data yields similar results to those that Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) found, confirming that close proximity to sex offenders has a 
negative impact on housing sales prices. Using models similar to those employed 
by Linden and Rockoff (2008), my research indicates that houses within 0.1 miles 
of a sex offender’s residence decrease in value by approximately 6%, while 
housing sales within 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender’s residence are not 
impacted by the arrival of a sex offender. The second part of my research adapts 
these models to analyze potential changes in housing sales prices caused by a 
North Carolina General Statute that imposes residency restrictions on sex 
offenders. Specifically, starting December 1, 2006, sex offenders are prohibited 
from living within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center. My research 
demonstrates that housing prices located within 1,000 feet of a school increase by 
                                                 
2 Over the 10 year span that they studied, there were 373 sex offenders who 
moved into homes in Mecklenburg County. The $60 million estimate was 
determined by multiplying the number of houses within 0.1 miles of these sex 
offenders by the average loss in property sale value due to the arrival of a sex 
offender. 
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approximately 2% due to the enforcement of residency restrictions on sex 
offenders.  
Both parts of my research help to explain the relationship between housing 
sales and perceived crime risk within a neighborhood. Public perception of sex 
offenders is that they are more likely to commit another crime, especially another 
sexual offense. Studies have shown this to be true, and it is estimated that sex 
offenders are 4 times more likely to be arrested for another sex crime when 
compared to non-sex offender (Langan et al. 2003). This increase in sex crime 
risk and the decrease in housing prices associated with a sex offender moving into 
a neighborhood as demonstrated by my research helps to explain the relationship 
between an increase in crime risk and the decrease in housing sales prices. This 
hedonic pricing model of property sales can provide valuable information on the 
relationship between proximity to sex offenders and property values. This 
information on the relationship between the amount of money that homeowners 
are willing to pay (or give up) to decrease the risk of crime can be used to further 
enhance public policy relating to sex offenders as well as programs or services to 
reduce the risk of crime.  
II. Background 
 
A. Institutional Setting 
 
 Sex offender registration laws have been in effect for almost two decades. 
In 1994, the Jacob Wetterling Act required states to register sex offenders. Jacob 
Wetterling was a young boy who was kidnapped while riding his bicycle home 
from a store with some friends. Neither Jacob nor the kidnapper was ever found. 
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This law was the start of a wave of legislation aimed to protect the public from 
sex offenders. In 1996, this law was expanded to include public notification of the 
residential address of sex offenders. While the exact requirements of this law vary 
from state to state, most states provide information about sex offenders’ names, 
residential locations and pictures to the public. 
 In 2005, the National Sex Offender Public Registry was established. This 
is a website that contains links to sex offender registries from all states. The 
following year, the registry was renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender 
Public Registry. Dru Sjodin was a college student at the University of North 
Dakota when she was murdered by a registered sex offender. This registry 
provides users with the ability to search for sex offenders by name, zip code, or 
by inputting an address and viewing all sex offenders that live within a certain 
radius. 
 North Carolina has one of the most informative sex offender registries of 
any state. It provides a range of identifying characteristics of sex offenders 
including pictures, names, height, weight, eye color and any other identifying 
scars or marks. Also, the registry has detailed information of the date and 
description of all crimes committed, as well as release dates and dates when sex 
offenders have moved into their current address. 
 While registries have become one of the most prominent ways of tracking 
and identifying sex offenders, there have been a number of other ways that states 
have tried to prevent sex offenders from committing future crimes and to protect 
neighborhoods, especially areas where children are present. As of 2006, more 
5 
 
than 20 states have passed some form of residency restriction on sex offenders. 
Typically, these laws prohibit sex offenders from living close to schools, parks, 
day care centers, and other areas where children congregate. Depending on the 
state, sex offenders cannot live within anywhere from 500 to 2,500 feet of one of 
these facilities.    
Starting on December 1, 2006, North Carolina enacted its own residency 
restriction law for sex offenders. This law prevents a sex offender from living 
within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center, and if caught, the offender may 
be charged with a felony. There are two noticeable exceptions to this law. First, 
the law grandfathers sex offenders living within close proximity to a school or 
child care center before December 1, 2006 and allows them to continue to reside 
at their current address. However, if they decide to move after December 1, they 
will be subject to the residency restriction laws. Furthermore, this statute does not 
prevent sex offenders from living near child care centers located within 1,000 feet 
of an institute of higher education, as long as the sex offender is a student or is 
currently employed at the institute. 
These laws are highly controversial, as many advocates argue that they 
have unintended consequences, such as severely limiting where a sex offender can 
reside. Typically, sex offenders who have just been released from prison are faced 
with the difficult task of finding affordable housing and advocates have argues 
that residency restrictions further reduce the availability of affordable housing. 
Consequently, advocates argue sex offenders either lie about their addresses or in 
extreme cases become homeless. 
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B. Related Literature 
 
 A number of economic papers have focused on the relationship between 
crime risk and property values (Hellman and Naroff 1979; Lynch and Rasmussen 
2001). Recently, economists have examined the relationship between the arrival 
of a perceived high risk individual to a neighborhood (e.g. a sex offender) and the 
effect on housing prices. While sex offenders are significantly more likely to 
commit another sex crime (Langan et al. 2003), there has been no conclusive 
evidence that sex offenders only target individuals near where they reside. In fact, 
Agan (2011) finds that there is no ability to infer where sex crimes will be 
committed based on sex offenders’ residential location. Together, this implies that 
there is no real risk of being located in close proximity to a sex offender, and that 
any decrease in property sales prices is caused by the perceived risk of living near 
a sex offender. 
 In 2003, Larsen et al. looked at the relationship between property values 
and nearby sex offenders by examining cross-sectional variation in data from 
Montgomery County, Ohio. Linden and Rockoff (2008) improve upon this model 
by using cross-sectional and inter-temporal data from Mecklenburg County to 
analyze the impact of the arrival of a sex offender on housing prices. While 
Larsen et al. (2003) estimated that houses sell for 17 percent less within 0.1 miles 
of a sex offender, Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimated that the true change is 
closer to 4%. They also examined their data using the framework of Larson et al. 
(2003), and observed that the 4% change increased to just under 20%, which they 
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attribute to Larson et al. (2003) not taking into account that sex offenders 
systematically move into cheaper houses than the average individual. 
 Economists have also examined the effects of residency restrictions on sex 
offenders. Adkins et al. (2000) , Durling (2006) , Levenson and Hern (2007), and 
Kang (2012)  have all looked at the consequences of residency restrictions, and 
have found no significant decrease in recidivism caused by these laws. Residency 
restrictions can also cause a severe decrease in available housing for sex 
offenders. In cities such as San Francisco, residency restrictions eliminate 
virtually all available housing for sex offenders (Lagos 2010). Furthermore, 
studies on residency restrictions indicate that sex offenders encounter increasing 
financial strain and have to live further away from public transportation access 
points as well as work areas (Levenson 2008). The lack of effectiveness 
associated with residency restrictions combined with the numerous unintended 
consequences have caused these laws to be extremely controversial. 
III. Methodology 
 
A. Data 
 
 My empirical analysis relied on two sources of data. Data from June 2012 
on sex offenders was obtained through the North Carolina Department of Justice. 
This data includes the current address of all sex offenders as well as the date that 
they registered at their address.3 By law, sex offenders are required to register 
within three business days of release from a penal institution, and if a sex offender 
                                                 
3 This data contains information on 18,872 sex offenders who have registered 
starting in December 1996. It is important to note that the data provides 
information on the current address of sex offenders, so my analysis does not 
consider sex offenders who frequently move residences. 
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moves, the sex offender must provide written notification of the new address 
within three business days. Because these laws are so strict, I can accurately judge 
when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood.  
 The other source of information is Mecklenburg County data on housing 
prices from December 2004 through December 2008. This information contains 
the address, date and sale price of all single-family houses in Mecklenburg 
County, as well as numerous identifying characteristics of each house, such as the 
number of heated square feet, bedrooms and bathrooms and an overview of the 
external condition of each house. Mecklenburg County also provided data on the 
locations of all charter, private and public schools. I normalize the sales prices to 
December 2006 dollars by using the Home Pricing Index for Charlotte, NC. 
 By combining these data sets, I am able to construct a data set that has the 
characteristics of every single family house that was sold, the distance between 
sex offenders and the houses that were sold and the dates of both the sex 
offenders’ arrivals and the housing sales. For the second part of my analysis, I add 
data on distances between housing sales and schools and child care centers to the 
dataset. 
 It is important to note that this data only reflects houses that are sold in 
Mecklenburg County, and therefore may not accurately represent the value of 
houses more broadly. Changes in composition of either buyers or sellers caused 
by the arrival of sex offenders to a neighborhood or the passing of the residency 
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restriction law in 2006 may cause my estimates to be either positively or 
negatively biased.4  
B. Sample Summary 
 
 For the first part of my research, I look at all housing sales that occurred 
between December 2004 and December 2006 that have a recorded sales price. 
After eliminating all housing sales prices below $40,000 and above $1.165 
million (the 1st and 99th percentile of housing sales prices), I am left with 20,588 
housing sales. 752 of these sales occurred within 0.3 miles of a sex offender, 
while 182 occurred within 0.1 miles of a sex offender. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the main characteristics of housing sales by location. It is clear from 
this information that sex offenders move to cheaper, smaller houses relative to all 
housing sales in Mecklenburg County. This further reinforces the need to use 
specific control groups in order to accurately measure the effects of sex offenders 
on housing prices.  
 The second half of my research relies on housing sales from December 
2004 to December 2008. Again, I include all housing sales except for those in the 
1st and 99th percentile, which leaves 43,039 total sales. I also discard all housing 
sales that occur near schools and child care centers that have a sex offender living 
within 1,942 feet. If a school or child care center already has a sex offender living 
within 1,000 feet, this law will have no effect on property values because the risk 
                                                 
4 It is possible that the arrival of a sex offender will cause people who are very 
averse to crime risk to immediately try to sell their houses. In order to expedite 
the sale, they may list their houses below the market value in order to attract a 
buyer as quickly as possible, which would negatively impact the accuracy of my 
estimates. 
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of having a sex offender live in that neighborhood will not be eliminated. 
Furthermore, since the treatment group does not have any neighborhoods with sex 
offenders, I need to construct a control group that is of a similar nature. Finally, if 
a sex offender lives just outside of the 1,4145 foot outer-radius of the control 
group, the sex offender can still affect housing prices, so I eliminate schools and 
child care centers where a sex offender lives within 5286 feet of the control group. 
Out of 43,019 sales, 4,360 sales occurred within 1,000 feet of a school or child 
care center and 3,923 sales occurred between 1,000 feet and 1,414 feet that fit the 
previous specification. Major characteristics of the housing sales can be seen on 
table 4. Unlike where sex offenders locate, houses that are close to schools tend to 
have similar characteristics, on average, when compared to all houses sold in 
Mecklenburg County. Even though these houses are very similar, we still want to 
limit our control group to those houses just outside the treatment group in order to 
eliminate other potential biases. 
C. Empirical Model 
 
 There are a large number of factors that go into choosing where to buy a 
house. Individuals must not only consider the characteristics of the house, such as 
the overall quality, size and numbers of bedrooms and bathrooms, but they must 
also consider the neighborhood. Moving close to a school can potentially benefit 
an individual or family with young children, while moving into an area with high 
taxes can be a detriment to home owners. Because of the multitude of highly 
                                                 
5 This radius was chosen so that the treatment and control groups have the same 
number of square feet. 
6 The first part of my research indicates that sex offenders influence housing 
prices within 0.1 miles (528 feet) of his or her residence. 
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varying neighborhood in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, it is essential that 
I do not solely rely on cross-sectional data in order to analyze the effects of sex 
offenders on housing prices. As seen on table 1, sex offenders move to smaller 
and cheaper houses. Therefore, it is essential that I look at very specific housing 
sales in both treatment and control groups to accurately examine both the 
influence of sex offenders on housing prices and the impact of residency 
restrictions on sex offenders. 
I limit my analysis to a treatment group of housing sales within 0.1 miles 
of a sex offender and the control group to housing sales between 0.1 to 0.3 miles 
of a sex offender. This ensures that I have an adequate amount of housing sales to 
analyze while simultaneously only examining houses that are in close proximity 
to one another.7 When examining the residency restrictions placed on sex 
offenders, I look at houses within 1,000 feet of a sex offender compared to those 
between 1,000 feet and 1,414 feet of a sex offender. While the 1,414 foot radius 
seems significantly smaller than the 1,000 foot radius, the number of square feet 
in both the control group and treatment group are the same. This provides a 
suitable number of housing sales in both the treatment and control group while 
still keeping the analysis free of bias, as houses in the treatment group are located 
in close proximity to houses in the control group. 
 Before I examine the effects of sex offenders on nearby housing prices or 
the change in housing prices caused by residency restrictions, I have to verify that 
                                                 
7 By having houses that are relatively close to one another, I can eliminate many 
sources of bias, as the close proximity guarantees that the control and treatment 
groups will be relatively homogenous. 
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the treatment and control groups that I have described are similar to each other so 
that the identification assumption holds in order for the difference-in-difference 
estimates to be accurate. The identification assumption for the first part of my 
research is that if a sex offender did not move into a neighborhood, there would 
be no change in the difference in housing prices between the treatment and 
control groups. I construct the following linear regression model to look at the 
differences in major characteristics of housing sales in the treatment and control 
groups. This model is: 
(1)   
I measure the log of the normalized sales price as a function of the distance from 
the sex offender (or where the sex offender will live) to the housing sale, a 
random error term, and a year specific term.  is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the housing sale occurs within one-tenth of a mile of where a sex 
offender is located or will locate and 0 otherwise. I also estimate all other major 
characteristics of housing sales using a similar equation, but instead of using the 
log of price as the dependent variable, I use other characteristics of housing sales. 
These regressions provide information about the differences in key housing 
characteristics in the treatment and control groups that I examine. 
 After I examine the differences between the treatment and control groups, 
I compare housing sales located within 0.1 miles of where a sex offender will 
locate to all other housing sales within the same year using the same regression 
model as before: 
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(2)   
Then, I re-estimate the previous model with all housing sales characteristics as 
well as neighborhood-year fixed effects added: 
(3)  
 is a vector of housing characteristics and  is a vector of coefficients.8 The 
neighborhood-year fixed effects term, , controls for both changes in houses 
prices caused by different neighborhoods, but also time trends across time in these 
neighborhoods. Using these two equations, I can compare the coefficients on the 
 term to see how well the observable characteristics of housing sales can 
predict the sales price.  
 Once I examine how well the observable characteristics of housing prices 
determine the sales price of a house, I estimate two difference-in-difference 
models. In the first model, I look at the treatment and control groups. The 
regression model is as follows: 
(4)  
Where  is a dummy variable that indicates whether a housing sale occurred 
before or after a sex offender arrived. In this model,  is the difference-in-
                                                 
8 The housing characteristics that I use in my regression models are: number of 
bedrooms, number of full bathrooms, number of half bathrooms, age of the house, 
an indicator variable for whether or not the house was built in the year it was sold, 
number of heated square feet and the overall quality of the exterior of the house. 
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difference estimate of the change in housing prices caused by the arrival of a sex 
offender. 
 Finally, I estimate the arrival of a sex offender by looking at all housing 
sales in Mecklenburg County and adding additional terms to the previous 
regression model.  is an indicator value that is 1 if a housing sale occurred 
between 0.1 and 0.33 miles of a sex offender and 0 otherwise. 
(5) 
In this regression model I am interested in the difference-in-difference value, . 
 I use the same estimation models to look at the impact of the residency 
restrictions laws, with two major changes.  now is a dummy variable set to 1 
if the housing sale occurred after December 1, 2006 and 0 otherwise, and the two 
dummy variables  and  are replaced by  and  , respectively. 
These variables are indicator variable that specify whether a property sale 
occurred within 1000 feet of a school or between 1000 feet and 1414 feet of a 
school. Finally, the identification assumption for the second half on my research 
is that if this statute did not come into effect in December 2006, then the 
difference in housing prices between the treatment and control groups before and 
after December 2006 would be the same. 
IV. Results 
 
 One of the main assumptions of the empirical model is that houses that 
sell in the treatment and control groups have similar characteristics. While table 1 
shows that the mean value of these housing characteristics is similar across both 
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groups, I also estimate the differences in housing characteristics by using 
variations of equation 1. I substitute the dependent variable with each of the major 
characteristics of houses, and the results are shown on table 2. Very few of my 
estimates of  are statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval, 
and of the variables that do change between the treatment and control groups, they 
do not change significantly. In the case of the log of the year that the house was 
built, while the coefficient is statistically different from 0, I estimate that its value 
is 0.004, or that houses within 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender are just 0.4% 
older than houses located within 0.1 miles of a sex offender. Also, while the 
difference in the number of bedrooms and half bathrooms is statistically different 
from 0, the number of bathrooms falls by 0.18 for houses located within 0.1 miles 
of a sex offender while the number of half bathrooms rises by 0.12. Both of these 
changes are extremely small, and therefore these results show that the control and 
treatment groups have no major differences. 
 The other major assumption of the empirical model is that these housing 
characteristics can accurately control for differences in housing prices. Estimating 
equation 2, the value of  is -0.402, which can be seen on the first column of 
table 3. This can be interpreted as houses located within 0.1 miles of a sex 
offender before the offender arrive sells for roughly 40% less than those located 
further away from where a sex offender will reside. In other words, houses 
located near a sex offender are already significantly cheaper than the average 
house sold in Mecklenburg County before a sex offender arrives. However, when 
I estimate equation 3, which is the same as equation 2 except for the addition of 
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housing characteristics as well as neighborhood-year fixed effects, the value of  
 changes to 0.0245, which is not statistically different from 0 at the 95% 
confidence level. This data is located on the second column of table 3. This 
implies that once we control for observable characteristics of housing sales, there 
is no difference in price. This implies that the characteristics of housing sales that 
are included in these regression models accurately control for observable features. 
 Once we have verified these two assumptions, I estimate equation 4. The 
two key coefficients in this equation are  and . I estimate that the value of  
is -0.062, which is significantly different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval, 
and  is 0.024, which is not statistically different than 0 at the 95% confidence 
interval. These figures can be seen in the third column of table 3. The value of  
implies that there is no difference in the value of a house between 0.1 and 0.3 
miles and a house within 0.1 miles of a sex offender once all observable 
characteristics are controlled for. Furthermore, the value of , which is the 
difference-in-difference estimator, implies that there is a significant non-zero 
decrease in housing prices when a sex offender arrives in a neighborhood. While 
the 6.2% decrease is statistically different from 0, it is not statistically different 
from the estimated 4% decrease in housing prices within 0.1 miles of a sex 
offender that Linden and Rockoff (2008) estimated. 
 I then expand my model to include all housing price sales and again 
estimate the difference-in-difference regression model specified in equation 5. 
The results can be seen in column 4 of table 3. The only coefficient that is 
statistically different from 0 is the difference-in-difference estimator ( ). Similar 
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to the last model, this estimate is not statistically different than the estimate from 
the previous model or from the estimate that Linden and Rockoff (2008) found. 
Furthermore, the estimate of   indicates that the arrival of a sex offender has no 
effect on houses that are between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a sex offender. This implies 
that the arrival of a sex offender only affects houses in the immediate vicinity 
(within 528 feet) of where the sex offender is residing.9 In other words, the 
decrease in housing sales prices cause by a sex offender is extremely localized. 
 Now that I have shown there is a significant decrease in housing sales 
prices caused by sex offenders, I can examine the impact of the residency 
restriction statute passed in 2006. I again rely on the key assumptions that houses 
located within 1,000 feet of a school are similar to those located between 1,000 
and 1,414 feet of a school and that these observable housing characteristics can 
accurately control for the varying prices of housing sales. 
 While table 4 shows the mean values of all key characteristics, I also 
estimate them using the same linear regression that I used for the first part of my 
research on table 5. The results indicate that the control and treatment groups are 
similar, however there are differences between the control and treatment groups. 
The treatment group tends to have smaller, cheaper houses with slightly fewer 
heated square feet, number of bedrooms and bathrooms. However, upon further 
examination, these differences are very small. The difference between treatment 
                                                 
9 My research as well as other related work on this topic indicates that sex 
offenders cause housing sales prices within 0.1 miles (528 feet) decrease 
significantly while those between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of where a sex offender 
resides do not decrease. However, this does not apply that a house located 527 
feet from a sex offender will experience a drop in price by roughly 6% while a 
house located 529 feet from a sex offender will not see a drop in price. 
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and control group of 112 square feet is very small, especially since Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) note in their paper that the average walk-in closet is about 80 feet. 
While houses in the control group and treatment group vary in terms of number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, these again are very small. Furthermore, since the 
treatment and control groups are located in extremely close proximity, it is very 
unlikely that an event could occur that would change housing prices in just the 
treatment or control groups. For this reason, as well as the next regression that I 
construct, it seems that the identification assumption will hold. 
 My estimate of  in equation 2 is -0.133 (shown in the first column on 
table 6), which is statistically different from 0. I then estimate equation 3, which 
takes into account differential prices in houses caused by the neighborhood that 
the house sells in as well as the key characteristics of a house. The results, shown 
in column 2 of table 6, indicate that  is only 0.007, or that houses located close 
to schools sell for only 0.7% more than other houses sold in Mecklenburg County. 
This number is not statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence interval. 
This shows that the added variables as well as neighborhood-year effects explain 
all of the difference between prices of housing sales located close to schools and 
other housing sales in Mecklenburg County. 
 Now that I have verified the key assumptions that the regression models 
rely on, I estimate the impact of the legislation through equation 4 , which is 
shown in column 3 of table 6.The difference-in-difference estimator ( ) is 
positive, which implies that eliminating the possibility of a sex offender moving 
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into a neighborhood increases housing sales prices by approximately 1.4%. This 
number is not statistically different from 0 at any reasonable confidence level.  
 The use of neighborhood-year fixed effects in this model helps to 
eliminate changes in neighborhoods across time to give us a more accurate 
estimate. However, one concern is that the fixed-effects terms are absorbing the 
effect of the statute in this model. For that reason, I re-estimate the difference-in-
difference estimator using the same equation with just neighborhood fixed effects 
(and still including housing characteristics). The result can be seen in column 4 of 
table 6. Now, the difference-in-difference estimator is 0.021, which is statistically 
different from 0 at the 95% confidence level. This model shows that there is a 
causal relationship between the passing of the residency restriction laws and the 
increase in housing prices. It must be noted that this regression model no longer 
accounts for changes in neighborhoods over time. However, as we are only 
observing housing prices within a 4 year window, these changes will have a 
minimal effect on difference-in-difference estimate obtained from the regression 
model. 
V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 According to the results of related research and hedonic pricing models, 
the perceived threat of crimes brought on by the arrival of a sex offender to a 
neighborhood should decrease housing values while the elimination of the 
possibility of an increase in crime risk caused by residency restriction laws should 
increase housing values. By examining residential locations of sex offenders in 
Mecklenburg County, NC and using both cross-sectional and time-series data, I 
20 
 
am able to accurately examine the effects of perceived crime risk on housing sales 
prices. My analysis relies on the assumption that differences in housing prices 
rely on observable characteristics of houses, which is demonstrated by my 
regression models. My findings support both of the conclusions suggested by 
theoretical models. When a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, housing 
sales prices within a localized area (up to 0.1 miles) decrease by approximately 
6%, while all housing sales prices further away from the sex offender’s residence 
are unaffected. I then use this finding to evaluate residency restrictions 
implemented in North Carolina in December, 2006. I find that these restrictions 
increase housing prices by approximately 2% in areas where a sex offender can 
no longer live (and where there were no sex offenders previously residing). This 
shows that the elimination of perceived crime risk posed by a sex offender 
positively influences housing prices, while the perceived increase of crime risk 
caused by a sex offender negatively influences housing prices.  
 My findings bring up several interesting related questions. While there is 
an overall increase in housing prices caused by residency restrictions within 
neighborhoods where a sex offender can no longer establish residency, there may 
be varying effects depending on proximity to the boundary of this neighborhood. 
Given a larger data set to work with, one could examine the increase in housing 
prices as a function of distance from the boundary of the zone where sex 
offenders can not live. 
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Table 1: Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses Sold in 
Mecklenburg County, 2004-2006 
 
 
All 
Sales 
Between 0.3 Miles  
and 0.1 Miles Within 0.1 Miles 
   
 Mean Mean Mean 
 (Std Err) (Std Err) (Std Err) 
Sale Price 2.223 1.435 1.354 
($100,000s) (0.011) (0.031) (0.036) 
Heated Sq. Ft. 2.225 1.664 1.67 
(1,000s) (0.007) (0.027) (0.034) 
Bedrooms 3.332 3.088 2.978 
 (0.006) (0.027) (0.045) 
Full Bathrooms 2.11 1.843 1.845 
 (0.004) (0.021) (0.027) 
Half Bathrooms 0.608 0.409 0.448 
 (0.004) (0.021) (0.038) 
Sample Size 20530 567 181 
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses within 0.3 Miles of a Sex 
Offender, Sold in Mecklenburg County, 2004-2006 
    
 Log Price Log Year Built 
Heated Sq. Feet 
(1000s) Bedrooms 
Number of Full 
Bathrooms 
Number of Half 
Bathrooms 
0.02 0.004 -0.025 -0.183 0.009 0.122 Differences in Sales Within 
0.1 Miles of Offender (0.047) (0.001)* (0.075) (0.080)* (0.059) (0.061)* 
Constant 11.736 7.592 1.611 3.082 1.84 0.38 
 (0.023)* (0.0006)* (0.037)* (0.039)* (0.029)* (0.030)* 
Sample Size 364 364 364 364 364 364 
R2 0.0008  0.04 0.006 0.016  0.001  0.018 
       
       
       
      
Note: Only single family homes sold before the arrival of a sex offender.  
* significant at 95% level.
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Table 3: The Effect of a Sex Offender’s Close Proximity to a 
Housing Sale 
 
 Log (Sale Price) Log (Sale Price) 
 
Pre-Arrival Within 0.1 
Miles Pre & Post-Arrival 
 All Sales All Sales 
Sales Within 
0.3 Miles 
All 
Sales 
-0.402 0.0245 0.024 -0.011 Within .1 Miles of 
Offender (0.060)* (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) 
  -0.062 -0.068 Within .1 Miles Post-
Arrival   (0.028)* (0.033)* 
   -0.019 Within 1/3 Miles of 
Offender    (0.016) 
   -0.006 Within 1/3 Miles Post-
Arrival    (0.021) 
     
Housing Char.  X X X 
Year FE X    
Neighborhood- Year FE  X X X 
     
Sample Size 20437 20437 748 20530 
R2 0.003 0.9 0.9 0.87 
 
*significant at 95% level. 
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Table 4: Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses Sold in 
Mecklenburg County, 2004-2008 
 
 
All 
Sales 
Between 1000 feet  
and 1414 feet Within 1000 feet 
   
 Mean Mean Mean 
 (Std Err) (Std Err) (Std Err) 
Sale Price 2.125 2.133 1.94 
($100,000s) (0.007) (0.032) (0.039) 
Heated Sq. Ft. 2.17 1.993 1.901 
(1,000s) (0.005) (0.014) (0.021) 
Bedrooms 3.291 3.199 3.109 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) 
Full Bathrooms 2.081 1.955 1.903 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) 
Half Bathrooms 0.594 0.526 0.489 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sample Size 43039 3923 4360 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Key Characteristics of Single Family Houses within 1414 feet of a School or 
Child Care Center, Sold in Mecklenburg County, December 1, 2004 through December 1, 2006 
    
 Log Price Log Year Built 
Heated Sq. Feet 
(1000s) Bedrooms 
Number of Full 
Bathrooms 
Number of Half 
Bathrooms 
-0.07 -0.0001 -0.112 -0.06 -0.045 -0.02 Within 1000 ft. of School 
or Child Care Center (0.018)* (0.0004)* (0.025)* (0.026)* (0.020)* (0.016) 
Constant 12.059 7.591 2.014 3.213 1.972 0.521 
 (0.013)* (0.0003)* (0.018)* (0.019)* (0.015)* (0.012)* 
Sample Size 4305 4305 4305 4305 4305 4305 
R2 0.007  0.0004 0.006 0.003  0.002  0.018 
       
       
       
      
Note: Only single family homes sold before the residency restriction statute comes into effect.  
* significant at 95% level.
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Table 6: The Effect of Residency Restriction on Housing Sales 
Prices 
 
 Log (Sale Price) Log (Sale Price) 
 
Pre-Residency 
Restrictions 
Pre & Post-Residency 
Restrictions 
 All Sales All Sales 
Sales Within 
1414 feet 
Sales Within 
1414 feet 
-0.133 0.007 -0.004 -0.008 Within 1000 ft. of School 
or Child Care Center (0.012)* (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
  0.014 0.021 Within 1000 ft. Post-
Residency Restrictions   (0.011) (0.010)* 
     
Housing Char.  X X X 
Year FE X    
Neighborhood- Year FE  X X  
Neighborhood FE    X 
     
Sample Size 21727 21727 8283 8283 
R2 0.006 0.87 0.90 0.87 
     
     
     
     
 
Note: Only housing sales in close proximity to schools that do not have a sex 
offender residing close to the school (within 1942 feet). 
 *significant at 95% level. 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
Throughout the past two decades, there have been a number of laws 
designed to increase public awareness of sex offenders. In North Carolina, all sex 
offenders either convicted or released from prison on or after January 1, 1996 
have to register to a sex offender database that is freely available online. Anyone 
who accesses the North Carolina Sex Offender Registry website has access to the 
names and locations of all registered sex offenders, as well as pictures and 
identifying information such as height, weight, scars and tattoos.  
One interesting economic consequence of the public availability of sex 
offenders’ locations is the influence on nearby housing prices. Leigh Linden and 
Jonah Rockoff, two economists at Columbia University, have studied the effects 
of sex offenders on nearby property values in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina. This is the most populated county in North Carolina, and includes one 
of the largest cities in the United States, Charlotte.  Through their research, they 
have concluded that when a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, the prices of 
nearby homes drop significantly. Analyzing data on property sales from 1994 
through 2004, they concluded that the average sale price of a house located within 
0.1 miles of a sex offender drops by about 4 percent, or roughly $5,500.  
Altogether, they estimate that property sales decreased by roughly $60 million in 
Mecklenburg County alone. They then go on to estimate the cost to victims of 
sexual offenses by combining the estimated loss of property sales with data on 
crimes committed by sexual offenders.  
30 
 
My research is divided into two parts. In the first half, I extend part of the 
research conducted by Leigh Linden and Jonah Rockoff. I use data on sex 
offenders and single family home property sales in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina to examine the effects of sex offenders on housing sale prices in the two 
years following their data. This new data yields similar results to those that 
Linden and Rockoff achieved, confirming that sex offenders still have a negative 
impact on housing sale prices. I then apply similar models to analyze possible 
changes on housing sale prices caused by a North Carolina General Statute that 
imposes residency restrictions on sex offenders. Specifically, starting December 
1, 2006, sex offenders can no longer live within 1,000 feet of a school or child 
care center. My research examines whether or not the elimination of the 
possibility of having a sex offender move to a neighborhood influences the prices 
of housing sales. 
In order to successfully analyze the effect of sex offenders on housing sale 
prices, I construct a treatment and control group of housing sales. Ideally, the 
houses in both the treatment and control groups will be very similar in 
characteristics. Before a sex offender arrives, the treatment and control groups 
should be composed of houses that are approximately the same value and size, 
and with other key characteristics such as number of bedrooms, bathrooms and 
overall quality of the house that are roughly the same. Furthermore, I have to 
ensure that the arrival of sex offenders does not impact the prices of housing sales 
in the control group. I then conduct a difference-in-difference estimation, where I 
compare the difference in housing sale prices between the treatment and control 
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group before the sex offender arrives in a neighborhood with the difference in 
housing prices after the sex offender arrives. This will give a rough estimate of 
the impact of a sex offender on housing prices.  
The best treatment group to use for this is the housing sales that lie closest 
to where a sex offender will live. These sales will be impacted the most by the 
arrival of a sex offender. Unfortunately, finding a suitable control group is slightly 
harder. Looking at all property sales that do not occur close to where a sex 
offender will live, these sales will not be impacted by the arrival of a sex offender. 
However, these houses are systematically different from those houses located near 
a sex offender. I show that, on average, sex offenders locate to smaller, cheaper 
houses, so I cannot use all other housing sales as a suitable control group. Instead, 
I examine housing sales that lie just slightly further away from a sex offender than 
the treatment group. More specifically, my treatment group will be housing sales 
that occur within 0.1 miles of a sex offender and my control group will be houses 
that lie between 0.1 and 0.3 miles away from a sex offender. Since these houses 
are located in such close proximity to each other, and oftentimes in the same 
neighborhoods, they have very similar characteristics and are therefore suitable 
treatment and control groups. 
Now that I have suitable treatment and control groups, I go about 
estimating the change in housing prices due to the arrival of sex offenders.  In 
order to offset the slight differences in the control and treatment groups, I 
constructed a linear regression model. This model provides the same difference-
in-difference estimate as before; however, it adjusts the estimate of the change in 
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housing sale prices caused by sex offenders in order to account for the slight 
variations in housing characteristics between groups. Also, I correct for possible 
changes in housing sale prices due to different neighborhoods. Since houses with 
similar characteristics in different neighborhoods often do not sell at the same 
price, I make sure to account for this variation.  
After accounting for these differences in housing characteristics, I found 
that houses selling within 0.1 miles of a sex offender sell for about 6% less than 
those within 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a sex offender. I then go on to construct another 
regression model in order to further justify these findings. Instead of looking at 
only housing sales within 0.1 miles and 0.1 to 0.3 miles of a sex offender, I look 
at all housing sales and take into account the distance from a house to a sex 
offender. This regression model gives an estimated decline of housing sales 
within 0.1 miles of a sex offender of 6.8%. The closeness of these two estimates 
to each other further strengthens my estimates, and leads me to conclude that sex 
offenders have a profound negative impact on property sales. 
Now that I have shown that sex offenders negatively impact property sales 
that take place in their immediate vicinity, I use the same framework to analyze 
the impact of a North Carolina General Statute on housing prices. This statute, 
which took effect on December 1, 2006, prohibited registered sex offenders from 
living within 1,000 feet of a school or child care center. However, if a sex 
offender was previously living with 1,000 feet of a school or child care center, he 
or she could remain there.  
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My analysis focuses on schools in Mecklenburg County, NC. I construct 
treatment and control groups in the same way as Linden and Rockoff did in their 
research. The treatment group is housing sales within 1,000 feet of a school, and 
the control group is housing sales between 1,000 and 1,414 feet of a school. 
While the 1,414 foot radius seems significantly smaller than the 1,000 foot radius, 
the number of square feet in both the control group and treatment group are the 
same. After examining these two groups, they are remarkably similar. There is no 
major difference between price, size, or any other characteristics of these homes. 
Also, the homes within 1,000 feet of a school will be impacted by this law, while 
those outside will not.  Again, I construct a linear regression model in order to 
account for the small amount of variation between the characteristics of the 
treatment and control groups as well as the different neighborhoods where these 
houses are located. After running this regression model, the result is that there is a 
2% increase in housing prices within 1,000 feet of a school due to the enactment 
of this statute.  
Together, these two parts of my research help understand both the change 
in housing sale prices caused by having a sex offender move into a neighborhood 
and the change in housing sale prices caused by the elimination of the possibility 
that a sex offender will move into a neighborhood. The first part of my research is 
essential to verify that sex offenders have a negative impact on housing prices 
within 0.1 miles of their residence. Once I establish this, I examine how a 
neighborhood reacts when the possibility of a sex offender arriving was 
eliminated through the North Carolina General Statute. I am able to prove that 
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there is a causal relationship between the passage of this statute and changes in 
housing sale prices within 1,000 feet of a school, which implies that this statute 
helps to offset the damages to housing sale prices caused by sex offenders. Even 
though related research has shown that this statute has had numerous negative 
consequences, such as failing to reduce recidivism among sex offenders, it does 
positively impact housing sales prices. 
 
